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Test as we Fly nor Fly as we Test ?
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“ ‘Test as you fly’ is a worthy goal. But if not quite a myth, 
it is at least ‘a custom more honoured in the breach...’ “ 
“ Better to do many imperfect tests early and understand, 
than to attempt a ‘perfect’ test, as it never actually will be 
so. “
….. by Ralph Lorenz.
(From his presentation on “Test-as-you-fly” environments 
for planetary missions, IPPW-2018) 
Can advances in multi-scale modelling and physics based 
simulation redefine “test” as we fly?
Background on Planetary Protection 
Requirements and the Grand Challenge
§ NASA Policy Directive 8020.7G requires compliance with 1967 UN 
Treaty on Outer Space Article IX, which states:
Ø Sample return from Mars and other water worlds: Category V 
• “Restricted Earth Return”  
• Highest degree of concern is expressed by the “Absolute prohibition of 
destructive impact upon return, the need for containment throughout 
the return phase ….” 
• Both ESA and NASA have defined design guidelines for mission studies in 
the past and these guidelines are evolving.
Ø Score card for less restrictive Sample Return Missions: 
• 2 successful (Stardust and Hayabusa) and 1 unsuccessful (Genesis)
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MSR Earth Entry Vehicle (and the TPS) need to be 
extremely robust against  all possible failure modes 
MSR Demands a New Approach
§ Reliability requirements for MSR demand a new approach
Ø Risk-based design, accounting also for common cause/mode failures, drives 
redundancy and diversity of system design [1]
Ø Perform studies with reliability as primary metric
• Allocation of functions to subsystems
• TPS role in MMOD protection and landing impact attenuation
• Dissimilar redundant capability
• TPS typically exempted from redundancy requirements: 
• Design for Minimum Risk
• Re-visit creative options for secondary TPS
• Account for consequence of primary failure on secondary load environment
• Safety features
• Detect incipient failure
• Sacrifice some science return to assure planetary protection
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[1] Conley, Catharine A., and Gerhard Kminek, "Planetary Protection for Mars Sample Return." ESA/NASA, April 29 (2013).
Potential Mars Sample Return – Notional Architecture
5Taken from the  IPPW -2018 presentation Marcus Lobia et al. 
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MSR EEV Campaign and Mission Design Challenges
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• Launch in 2026 - SRL and (ERO with EEV) missions 
• ESA-NASA collaboration 
• Mission Architecture and design(s) need to be technically robust.
• Need to be tolerant to programmatic,  schedule and budget constraints.  
• This is what makes MSR - EEV  a grand challenge and an opprotunity.  
Current MSR EEV Concepts Under Consideration
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• PICA will need to be single piece 
(like Stardust but much bigger
• HEEET – Tiled with seams
• Tested at much higher conditions
• Other 3-D Woven could be single 
piece
• Need further development 
• Many different forms of Carbon-
Carbons  
• 2-D and 3-D or combination
• Single or multi-piece
• DoD experience base ( + and -) 
• Hot-structure construct
• Design, Manufacturing, integration 
and certification challenges
Cold Structure EEV Concept
PICA and 3-D Woven (HEEET and Variants) 
C/C EEV Concept
2-D and 3-D Carbon-Carbon 
Design concepts have to be robust against 
MMOD, entry and ground impact and be mass efficient  
Orion Post- PDR ISS Lunar
Requirement: Loss of Crew 1/290 1/200
TPS Allocation 1/5600 1/2100
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• Waiver required for EFT-1 test flight, due to negative structural margins against 
cracking of Avcoat ablator (Vander Kam, Gage) 
• PRA estimate for structural failure due to TPS bond-line over temperature ~1/160,000 (6.25e-6)
Orion Crew Vehicle Reliability allocations
From: (AIAA 2011-422) 
• Shuttle  Analysis of data from successful flights (did not include consideration of off-nominal 
TPS states) estimated TPS reliability  of 0.999999 ( or failure < 1.0x10-6)
– Columbia accident highlighted need for consideration of damage due to debris impact
• Robotic missions (No known mission failures due to TPS failure) (most not instrumented)
– Recession data for Galileo indicated near failure at shoulder
– MSL identified shear-induced failure mode for SLA during ground test campaign – switch to PICA
– Root cause of Mars DS2 failure unknown, but entry failure deemed unlikely
• Need comprehensive hazard analysis
• Assess likelihood and consequence for each hazard
• Need robust performance margins for all failure modes 
• Ground test to failure to establish performance limits
State of the Art: System and TPS Reliability
State of the Art: 
TPS and Thermo-Structural Modeling
Reliable As Primary Design Input
§ 1D thermal sizing*
§ Multi-dimensional conduction*
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Must be Obtained Via Test
• Singularities (e.g. cut-outs, windows, 
closeouts, seals)
• Failure modes
• Off-nominal performance (damage)
• Reliability assessment
• Materials design
*once models have been calibrated with arc jet data for conditions and materials of relevance
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Must be Augmented Via Test
§ Tiled systems / gap performance
§ Thermo-structural performance
§ Margin assessment 
Design Development Testing Manufacturing Integration Flight Certification 
Do we know how to do (thermal) margin?
§ A TPS system is designed (margined) to a given reliability
Ø In other words, it must be robust to off-nominal conditions
Ø Thickness margin is typically applied as one reliability factor
§ Thickness margin is evaluated by evaluating uncertainties in 
environments and material performance and tracking their influence 
on design metrics of interest (e.g. bondline temperature)
Ø Goal is a full Monte-Carlo process, but we are not there yet
Ø Margin assessment is currently reliant on statistical performance data (Arc Jet testing)
10MC Analysis of thermal margin Statistical analysis of Arc Jet data
PICA:
52 samples
Mean error = 8%
3s Deviation = ±26%
Inferred Thermal Margin = 100°F
Avcoat:
21 samples
Mean error = 14%
3s Deviation = ±25%
Inferred Thermal Margin = 66°F
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Understanding the Features  
From TPS Material to Integrated System
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HEEET 1m Engineering Test Unit (ETU)Orion EM1 5.0 m Heat-shield (block Avcoat, RTV 
gap    filler, Compression Pad, Instrumented Plugs) 
Stardust single piece, seamless  heatshield  
MSR EEV ?
Larger than Stardust 
(smaller than Orion)
entry at ( ~ 13.5 km/s)
Ballistic entry
MMOD Impact
Chuteless
Impact Landing
Needed: Characterization of TPS -
Features,  Flaws and Failure
§ Acreage
Ø Through Thickness cracks causing “heat leaks”
Ø In plane cracks causing reduced thickness
Ø Surface erosion 
• Mechanical failure causing spallation or accelerated layer loss
• Melt flow
Ø Flow through (permeability permits interior flow)
§ Loss of attachment of tiles or gap fillers, causing complete loss 
of thermal material over a large area
Ø Adhesive mechanical failure
• Substrate failure adjacent to adhesive
Ø Adhesive thermal failure
§ Cracking and opening of seams, permitting a “heat leak” in the 
gaps between tiles
Ø Adhesive mechanical failure
• Tile failure adjacent to adhesive
Ø Adhesive char and erosion
§ Material response prediction error
Ø Recession rate error
• Differential recession at seam
Ø Conduction
Structural Aero/Material
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Missions and Induced Features and Flaws
§ Launch to Landing
Ø Launch, 
Ø deep space cold soak, 
Ømicro-meteor and orbital debris, 
Ø entry and 
Ø landing
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Physics-based impact and hole growth tools needed to 
assess the MMOD risk 
Unique Challenge for MSR EEV
§ Human missions certification is via ground and flight tests (Orion as well 
as Commercial Crew) combined with simulation
§ MSR EEV demands a different approach
Ø Robustness requirement is more stringent than human missions
Ø Launch by 2026 time-line does not allow for flight test
Rethinking our approach –
§ Design from the perspective of certification 
Ø Will require understanding features that become flaws and flaws that lead to 
failure.  Can we design these features that lead to failure? Can we introduce 
features that prevent failure? 
§ Certification through modeling and simulation anchored to tailored tests
Ø Physics based multi-scale modeling and simulation tools anchored to relevant test 
data.
§ A great opportunity for Multi-scale integrated modeling approach
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TPS certification will be the biggest challenge 
as well as the opportunity
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Questions? 
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